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Abstract 
In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Cappelen and Lepore argue for the Controversial 
Aspect (CA) which is a part of their Speech Act Pluralism and which says that speakers 
don’t have privileged access to what they say. Gross (2006) criticizes C&L’s argument for 
CA and urges them to abandon that claim. I argue that on C&L’s broad understanding of 
the notion of what is said, CA (and whole SAP) is trivial, whereas on a more restricted 
understanding CA is indeed controversial and plausibly false. Moreover, the broad 
reading of what is said is incompatible with one of C&L’s tests for context-sensitivity. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore argue for 
semantic minimalism and against both moderate and radical contextualism. They argue 
that radical contextualism is internally inconsistent and moderate contextualism is not 
much better since it leads directly to the radical version. Their semantic minimalism is 
the view that the semantic content of the sentence S is the content that all utterances of S 
share (the so-called minimal proposition). Minimal proposition depends on context only 
when the sentence contains indexical expressions, which are – according to them – very 
few and far between (roughly those from Kaplan’s list1). Otherwise it is context-
insensitive.2 The sentence “Rudolf has a red nose” expresses the minimal proposition 
that Rudolf has a red nose independently of the context in which it is uttered; the 
sentence “Rudolf has had breakfast” expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf has 
had breakfast, the sentence “Rudolf is ready” expresses the minimal proposition that 
Rudolf is ready, and so on.3 Cappelen and Lepore admit that the proposition semantically 
expressed by an utterance u of a sentence S does not exhaust the speech act content of u 
(2005: 145). Hence, with semantic minimalism comes speech act pluralism. Stephen 
Gross (2006) distinguishes two central claims in speech act pluralism: Basic Pluralism, 
which says that speech act content includes an indefinite number of propositions and the 
Controversial Aspect which is the claim that speakers do not have privileged access to 
what they say and do not even have to believe what they sincerely say. The evidence for 
the truth of both these claims is indefinite range of true and accurate indirect speech 
reports concerning a particular utterance. Gross argues that the Controversial Aspect is 
very controversial indeed and that Cappelen and Lepore would be better off without it. 
                                               
1 See Kaplan 1989: 489. 
2 Hence all context-dependence is grammatically triggered (see 2005: 144). 
3 Cf. Cappelen & Lepore 2005: 3. 
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Gross considers the following situation (2006: 12). A utters “Julia went to the Whole 
Foods”. According to Cappelen and Lepore A’s utterance may be reported in many 
various ways (depending on contexts). For instance, B might say  
 
(i) “A said that Julia went to the Whole Foods”,  
(ii) “A said that Julia went to the supermarket”,  
(iii) “A said that Julia’s getting the chips”,  
(iv) “A said that Julia will be gone for a bit”.  
 
If B and C know of Julia that she is Ann’s younger daughter and B knows that C doesn’t 
know that that girl’s name is “Julia” B may report A’s utterance to C by saying  
 
(v) “A said that Ann’s younger daughter went to the supermarket”,  
 
even though A knows nothing of Julia’s ancestry. If we accept (i) – (iv) as accurate, we 
get Basic Pluralism, and if we accept (v) as well – we have the Controversial Aspect. If 
A’s utterance may accurately be reported as (v), A doesn’t know and doesn’t believe 
what she said. Gross (2006: 12-13) points out that the Controversial Aspect results in 
rejecting many plausible claims:  
 
 “one must deny (…) that what one sincerely asserts, even when one relevantly knows 
one’s mind and does not misspeak, accurately expresses what one thinks”, 
 “[o]ne must deny as well that an action can be sincere only if it’s performed 
intentionally”,  
 “one must deny that assertions that are not misspeakings must be intentional”,  
 “[i]n addition, one must deny that one can always be held responsible – epistemically or 
otherwise – for what one asserts”. 
 
Gross argues that Cappelen and Lepore’s implicit argument for the Controversial 
Aspect is “something like the following principle” (Gross 2006: 13): if (1) A utters ‘P’, 
(2) B utters about A’s utterance ‘A said that Q’, and (3) speakers judge what B said 
accurate, then the proposition semantically expressed by ‘Q’ is part of the speech act 
content of A’s utterance.  
Gross argues further that (3) – as stated – is ambiguous, because it is unclear whether 
what the speakers judge is the accuracy of the semantic content or the speech act content 
of B’s report. If this argument is to be an argument for the Controversial Aspect it must 
be the semantic content that is relevant (for if the speakers judge the speech act content 
then this has no direct bearing on the proposition semantically expressed by ‘Q’ being or 
not being part of the speech act content of A’s utterance). However, Gross notices that 
there is no reason to expect – and certainly Cappelen and Lepore should not expect4 – 
that speakers are good judges of the accuracy of the proposition semantically expressed 
by an indirect report.  
                                               
4 Since Cappelen and Lepore point out that “[i]n most regular-life contexts, the semantic content is 
not what is focused upon” (2005: 207). See also Gross 2006: 14. 
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Cappelen and Lepore in their reply to Gross offer another version of the principle:  
 
If (1) A utters ‘P’, (2) B utters about A’s utterance ‘A said that Q’, and (3) speakers judge 
what B said accurate, then we have evidence that the proposition saliently asserted by the 
complement clause of that report is part of the speech act content of A’s utterance (2006: 
72).  
 
In this version it is unproblematic that “what B said” in (3) refers to the speech act 
content of B’s report.  
It has to be noted that this version of the principle is very week. First of all, it 
concerns the relation between contents of two speech acts and amounts to the claim that 
A’s speech act and B’s speech act share part of their content. Since according to Basic 
Pluralism speech act content includes an indefinite number of propositions the principle 
is not very revealing. Moreover, it does not deal with semantic content any more, so it 
does not say anything about “saying” as distinct from e.g. “implying”, “implicating”, etc. 
Therefore, in this version the principle cannot be used as an argument for the 
Controversial Aspect. The notion of saying to which it appeals is so broad that the 
Controversial Aspect based on it would not be controversial anymore. If we assume that 
by saying that p I also say, e.g., all logical consequences of p, then obviously I do not 
have a privileged access to what I say. It is equally obvious however that we do not use 
“say that” in that way. Moreover, the principle in its new version still does not allow us 
to treat cases such as the following (see Gross 2006: 17). Imagine that B has reported A’s 
utterance as (v). In such a situation Ann may complain to A that she betrayed her, 
because she revealed that Ann has a daughter (whom she had given up for adoption). 
Thus, instead of clarifying the relation between saying and accurate indirect speech 
reports, the principle muddles things up. Cappelen and Lepore argue against 
distinguishing different meanings of “saying that” and claim that they  
 
don’t see how to elicit intuitions about what-is-said by an utterance of a sentence without 
appealing to intuitions about the accuracy of indirect reports of the form ‘He said that….’ 
‘What he said is that …’(1998: 280).  
 
It seems to me that we have two options here:  
1. Interpret “what is said” pragmatically and identify it with the speech act content. Then 
it will be the case that accurate indirect reports are good guides to speech act content. 
However, on such an interpretation of “what is said” the controversial aspect (together 
with Basic Pluralism and whole Speech Act Pluralism) turns out to be trivial.  
2. Interpret “what is said” semantically and identify it with the semantic content. But 
then even accurate indirect reports are bad guides to what is said. The Controversial 
Aspect is very controversial indeed (not to say false). 
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2. Pragmatic and semantic “what is said” 
 
Let us consider the pragmatic option first. 
In his 2004 paper Lepore writes (p. 65): „our reporting practices clarify that 
semantics should not a priori constrain what can and cannot be said by an utterance.” He 
and Cappelen provide the following examples of the situations with indirect speech 
reports: 
 
1.  “A: At around 11 p.m., I put on a white shirt, a blue suit, dark socks and my brown Bruno 
Magli shoes. I then got into a waiting limousine and drove off into heavy traffic to the 
airport, where I just made my midnight flight to Chicago. 
A said that he dressed around 11 p.m., went to the airport and took the midnight flight to 
Chicago.” (1997: 283) 
 
2.  François: Chartreuse is Maria’s favourite colour. 
François said that the colour of that dress is Maria‘s favourite colour. (cf. 2004: 63) 
 
3.  Professor H, when asked whether Alice passed her exam, answers with: I failed no one. 
Professor H said Alice passed her exam. (ibid.) 
 
4.  A: ‘I saw John wearing his blue jacket this morning’.  
John owns exactly one jacket and it’s definitely not blue. “If asked by someone else whether 
John was wearing his jacket this morning, [B] can correctly report [A] as having said that he 
was wearing his jacket.” (2004: 64-65). 
 
As we can see the first report considerably shortens the original utterance, the second 
replaces the name of the colour with a demonostrative description, the third reportee 
reports conversational implicature as what was said while the fourth changes the original 
utterance in such a way as to make it true. Lepore argues that all of these reports are, at 
least in some contexts, accurate indirect reports. Thus, it may be the case that although it 
is correct to say that the speaker said that p, p is not the semantic content of his 
utterance.5 Since according to Cappelen and Lepore the accurate indirect reports from 
the utterance U establish what was said by U, they are forced to reject ‘Original 
Utterance Centrism’ as a result. They claim that “said that” is a four-place relation 
between the utterance, its context, the report and its context. Thus, in some contexts, the 
reporter and his context are as important for determining what was said as the original 
utterer and his context. If so, then it becomes obvious that the speaker may not know 
what he said: the hearer is as much of an authority on what was said as the speaker is. 
                                               
5 Cappelen and Lepore argue that the reverse correlation also doesn’t hold. It is not always the case 
that if p is the semantic content of N’s utterance, then one can say that N said that p. Let’s 
assume that N said “12 is a dozen”. “12 is a dozen” expresses the same proposition as “12 is 12”. 
One cannot say however, that N said that “12 is 12” (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 286). It 
seems that the only way to reject this is to argue that sentences which differ only in purely 
referential expressions may express different propositions (i.e. may have different semantic 
content). 
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Let us turn to the second – semantic – option now. There is no denying that the notion of 
what is said is unclear. In particular it is controversial whether it is a part of the literal 
meaning or a part of the speaker meaning. However, it seems to me that we gain nothing 
by abandoning the distinction between what was said and what was communicated 
altogether. Broadening the notion of what is said in such a way that it encompasses what 
was implicated does not solve anything. On the contrary, it makes things worse, for it 
makes impossible for speakers to deny that they have said something. If hearers judge 
the indirect speech report as accurate the original speaker has no way to object. For 
instance, in the situation (v) envisaged above A cannot defend herself against Anne’s 
charge that she’s revealed Ann’s long hidden secret. In addition, speakers’ intuitions 
concerning accuracy of the report are not always a reliable guide. We may imagine that 
speakers who first judged B’s report (v) accurate, later – i.e. after Anne’s accusation – 
would agree with A that she didn’t say that Anne’s younger daughter went to the 
supermarket. There is no denying that ‘said that’ is vague and ambiguous in natural 
language. 
It seems to me that there are at least four distinct ways in which one may attempt to 
report someone else’s speech indirectly. In the situation described above: 
(1) B may try to report as closely as possible what A (literally) said (i.e. to report the 
semantic meaning of A’s utterance).  
(2) B may try to report A’s utterance in such a way that it captures what B takes A to be 
communicating (i.e. to report the speaker meaning of A’s utterance).  
(3) B may attempt to report A’s utterance in such a way that it will allow B’s audience 
to understand what A (literally) said. Finally,  
(4) B may report what A said in such a way that B’s audience understands what B has 
taken A to be communicating. 6  
In the last three cases B’s utterance is not a mere report; he makes his own contribution. 
In (2) B reports how he understood A. In (3) and (4) B tries to facilitate the 
understanding of what A said/communicated. In all three cases A may object to B’s 
report even though the audience judges the report accurate. In the first case B’s utterance 
“A said that Q” means precisely “A said that Q”. In the second case it means roughly 
“from what A said I (i.e. B) understood that Q”. In the third case B means “what A said 
can be best conveyed to you as Q”. In the fourth case B says in fact: “what A meant can 
be best conveyed to you as Q”. In the cases (2) – (4) B’s report is not so much a report 
on what A said but rather it is a self-report on how B understood what A said and/or how 
he think it is best to convey it to others. In this sense what A actually said only partially 
determines what B may accurately report. The other part is B’s own contribution, for 
which he may be held responsible.  
If we keep all these different meanings of “said that” separate, then it is easier to deal 
with the tricky cases. In particular it allows A to reject the charge that she revealed 
something that was merely implicated by what she said but was fully revealed by B’s 
                                               
6 If A implies something conversationally by his utterance then one might distinguish two further 
ways of reporting: B may try to report (v) in a way that captures best what A conversationally 
implicated or else in such a way that B’s audience is able to understand best what A 
conversationally implicated. However in my opinion in this two cases B does not report what A 
said. 
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report. Moreover, it becomes clear that the Controversial Aspect is not only controversial 
but false for some of the meanings of “what is said”.  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The question “What did A say?” is often a question concerning not the exact words 
uttered by A, but implicatures, intended meaning of A’s utterance, etc. Equally often it 
might be a question of clarification. From this observation Cappelen and Lepore derive 
the conclusion that indirect speech reports have to take into account certain non-semantic 
features of the reported utterance and features of the context of the report itself (see 
1997: 291). Lepore (2004: 67) concludes: “what happens to our words with their fixed 
meanings once they leave our mouths is often beyond our control”. 
It seems, however, that a different conclusion might be drawn form this observation: 
indirect speech reports are not, contrary to what Cappelen and Lepore assume, good 
evidence of what was said in an utterance. Such reports are not focused on what was said 
as opposed to what was communicated and as such are worthless as indications of the 
former, unless it is interpreted very broadly á la Cappelen and Lepore. However, the 
notion of what is said understood so broadly is philosophically uninteresting. Moreover 
broad “what is said” may contradict what was said literally.  
If we assume the broadest interpretation of “what is said” that the Controversial 
Aspect is trivial rather than controversial. In particular on this interpretation what is said 
is different from what is asserted and the undesired consequences mentioned by Gross 
won’t follow. We don’t have to reject intuitive claims concerning the relation between 
what is asserted and what is believed by the speaker because the Controversial Aspect 
doesn’t concern what is asserted. The thesis that we are not responsible for what we say 
in the broad sense is controversial at the first glance, but once we realize that what is said 
is constituted by the hearer as well as by the speaker, then it will become obvious that 
the speaker is not always responsible for what he said. Moreover, sometimes the 
responsible one will be the reportee. The title of Gross’s paper is phrased as a question 
„Can one sincerely say what one doesn’t believe?”. If we assume the broad 
understanding, then this question cannot even be asked, because one cannot sensibly ask 
whether what A said in the broad sense was sincere.  
In addition, the whole Speech Act Pluralism becomes evident for its second 
component – basic pluralism – is also, just like the Controversial Aspect, a trivial thesis.  
It is also worth mentioning that broad understanding of “what is said” is 
incompatible with a “says-that” test for context-sensitivity invented by Cappelen and 
Lepore. As it was mentioned at the beginning Cappelen and Lepore think that there are 
only few indexical expressions in natural language. “Now”, “here”, “I”, “he” and the like 
are context-sensitive, but the rest do not depend on context. They have invented three 
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tests7 which are suppose to determine8 which expressions are context sensitive. One of 
those tests concerns intercontextual disquotational indirect reports. It is argued that 
context-sensitive expressions block such reports: they cannot be correctly reported 
disquotationally across contexts. Imagine that A says “I’m hungry now”. B reports A’s 
utterance by saying immediately after: A said that I’m hungry now. Clearly such a report 
is incorrect. This is supposed to indicate that “I” is context-sensitive. Now take the 
example of “ready”, which is an expression that is thought by contextualists to be 
context-sensitive. In the context in which preparations for an exam are being discussed A 
says “John is ready”. In another context, in which preparations for going on holiday are 
discussed, B reports A’s utterance by saying: A said that John is ready. Cappelen and 
Lepore claim that such report is correct and hence “ready” is not context-sensitive. It is 
clear however that their claim is plausible only if we assume minimal understanding of 
what is said. Only than can we claim that B is right in saying that A said that John is 
ready. If “what is said” is understood in a broader way, then B won’t be entitled to report 
A’s utterance just by saying “A said that John is ready”, for in B’s context – on a broad 
understanding of “what is said” – such a report would mean “A said that John is ready to 
go for holiday”. 
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